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Abstract
Large infrastructure projects are a major responsibility of government, who usu-
ally lacks expertise to fully specify the demanded projects. Contractors, typically
experts on such projects, advise of the needed design in their bids. Producing the
right design is nevertheless costly.
We model the contracting for such infrastructure projects taking into account
this credence goods feature and examine the performance of commonly used con-
tracting methods. We show that when building costs are public information, multi-
stage competitive bidding involving shortlisting of two contractors and contingent
compensation of both contractors on design eﬀorts outperforms sequential search
and the traditional Design-and-Build approach. While the latter leads to minimum
design eﬀort, sequential search suﬀers from a commitment problem. If building costs
are the private information of the contractors and are revealed to them after design
cost is sunk, competitive bidding may involve sampling more than two contractors.
The commitment problem under sequential search may be overcome by the pro-
curer’s incentive to search for low building cost if the design cost is suﬃciently low.
If this is the case, sequential search may outperform competitive bidding.
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11 Introduction
Contracting for large infrastructure projects, including public transportation, public ser-
vices and utilities, and environmental restoration, is a main responsibility of urban and
regional government. Such projects are typically complex and are beyond the expertise of
the government, whereas contractors usually have the needed expertise. As a result, con-
tracting for such projects involves eliciting from potential contractors information about
the right design needed by the government. This is a typical feature of credence goods.1
In this article we take the credence goods feature of infrastructure projects into account
and study how it aﬀects the procurement process.
In an infrastructure project, the government’s objective is two-fold: 1) eliciting from
the contractors the right design which is costly to produce for the contractors; 2) ﬁnding
a low price for the building of the project.
We set up a model capturing the essential feature of an infrastructure project that
requires nontrivial design before it is built.2 The government asks the contractors to
formulate a design. The beneﬁt to the government from contracting the project depends
on the quality of the design and its building cost. Using this setup and assuming that
building costs are public information, we examine the performance of commonly used con-
tracting methods, including traditional Design-Build approach, multi-stage competitive
bidding and sequential search.
A prevalent response to the issues of asymmetric information is the wide adoption of
the Design-Build approach in public sector where the design and the build of a project are
contracted to a single contractor. The contractor can either be selected through competi-
tive bidding, sequential bargaining, or random draw. Under such an approach, the design
phase is carried out after a contractor is selected and a price for building is ﬁxed. Since
the design eﬀort is unobservable and the outcome of the project is nonveriﬁable, moral
hazard problem is unavoidable and the resulting design eﬀort by the selected contractor
is minimal, echoing real world concern that Design-Build approach sacriﬁces quality and
1Credence goods refers to the type of goods or service where a buyer does not know the exact spec-
iﬁcation of the goods or service she needs while the supplier is able to determine this need. Besides
infrastructure projects, medical services, repair services and various types of consulting and advisory ser-
vices belong to this broad category. Darby and Karni (1973) ﬁrst introduced the term ‘credence goods’
for these services. Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) provide a comprehensive survey of the research done
on the topic.
2The model is adapted from Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003). They study solely sequential search
while we examine the performance of several diﬀerent procurement methods under diﬀerent information
structures.
2design innovation. (See, for example, Akintoye and Fitzgerald (1995).)
We then consider a variation of the Design-Build approach which we refer to as “Multi-
stage Competitive Bidding”. Under this approach, several shortlisted contractors are asked
to submit a design as well as a price for the building of the project. If the recommended
designs of the contractors match, the government infers that the contractors have spent
high design eﬀorts and have come up with the right design. The project will be awarded to
the one who has quoted the lowest price for the building of the project. All the shortlisted
contractors will be reimbursed for their design eﬀort. Shortlisting multiple contractors
serves as a commitment tool for the government to elicit the right design, while rebating
the shortlisted contractors for their design eﬀort provides an incentive for them to choose
high design eﬀort. We ﬁnd that multi-stage competitive bidding is almost socially eﬃcient
since two contractors are sampled, they choose high design eﬀort and the right design is
implemented at its marginal cost in equilibrium.
Another variation of the Design-Build approach we look at is “Sequential Search”
where the government elicits sequentially a design and a price for building from each
contractor. Under this approach, there does not exist an equilibrium where a contractor
always chooses high design eﬀort. The ineﬃciency comes from a commitment problem
of the procurer. If all contractors exert high design eﬀort, the procurer will not sample
more than one contractor. However if the procurer always samples just one contractor,
this contractor has no incentive to invest in design. In equilibrium, the procurer samples
a second contractor with some probability as a disciplining device for the ﬁrst sampled
contractor, and all the sampled contractors randomize between high and low design eﬀort
in equilibrium. As a result, the right design is elicited and implemented with probability
strictly less than one.
Among the three contracting approaches, multi-stage competitive bidding is the most
eﬃcient when building costs are public information or are private information of contrac-
tors but known before the eﬀort in design is chosen. When a non-degenerate equilibrium
exists, contractors always choose high design eﬀort. As a result the right design is always
produced and implemented, though at the cost of extra design eﬀort and search cost.
In comparison to sequential search, competitive bidding serves as a commitment tool to
sampling multiple contractors, which forces contractors to choose high design eﬀort with
probability 1.
When the building costs are private information of the contractors and are revealed to
them only after the design eﬀort is sunk, it may be optimal for the government to shortlist
more than two contractors under competitive bidding. If the design cost is suﬃciently
3low, sequential search overcomes the commitment problem because the procurer has a
high enough probability to always sample more than one contractor to achieve a low
building price. In this case, sequential search may outperform competitive bidding because
the optimal stopping price employed by the procurer under sequential search may be
lower than the expected second lowest cost. Moreover, the ex ante expected number of
contractors to be sampled may be lower for sequential search compared to the number of
contractors shortlisted under competitive bidding.
In the remaining part of this section, we present the related literature. In Section 2,
the model is presented. In Section 3, 4, 5, and 6, we analyze in sequence the equilibrium
of Design-Build, multi-stage competitive bidding and sequential search and compare their
performance under the assumption that building costs are public information. In Section
7, we examine the case that building costs are private information. Concluding remarks
can be found in Section 8.
1.1 Related Literature
First of all, our paper is related to the literature on the management of infrastructure
project contracting.3 The complexity of infrastructure projects and the prevalence of
asymmetric information between the procuring government and the contractors have been
well acknowledged in the engineering world. Most papers on infrastructure procurement
either take an empirical approach, by collecting data from projects implemented through
Design-Build or other delivery methods, and analyzing the common factors that might be
critical to the success of those methods (see, for example, Ndekugri and Turner (1994),
Molenaar and Songer (1998), Molenaar, Songer, and Barash (1999), and EI Wardani,
Messner, and Horman (2006)); or take a survey approach by collecting and summarizing
interviewing results with experts (see, for example, Akintoye and Fitzgerald (1995)). Our
paper complements this literature by formalizing an economic model capturing the key
factors in infrastructure projects and carrying out a normative analysis on the several
most important procurement methods.
Second, our paper relates to the literature on credence goods. Dulleck and Ker-
schbamer (2006) provide a comprehensive survey. Most contributions in that literature
leave aside the costly design problem by either assuming costless design (see, for example,
3In economics literature, there is a large number of contributions on public sector procurement. For
example, Vagstad (1985), de Silva, Dunne, Kankanamge, and Kosmopoulou (2008). These papers usually
assume that the government understands perfectly the project to be procured, hence leaving aside the
credence goods feature.
4Pitchik and Schotter (1987) and Fong (2005)) or design eﬀort is observable and a fair
design fee can be imposed (see, for example, Wolinsky (1993), Wolinsky (1995), Emons
(1997), Emons (2001), Alger and Salanié (2006)). Exceptions are Pesendorfer and Wolin-
sky (2003) and Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2009). Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003) study
the case where design eﬀort is costly and unobservable and contractors need to be incen-
tivized to invest in design eﬀort. Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2009) study the competition
between experts that choose to exert eﬀort and those that choose not to. Similar to
Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003), we assume that the contractors’ design eﬀort is un-
observable and costly and the ﬁnal success of the service is not contractible. The main
diﬀerence is that they analyze only sequential search assuming publicly known constant
building cost, while we analyze the performance of three diﬀerent methods under two
diﬀerent information structures. Adding to their work, we show that if building costs
are public information, multi-stage competitive bidding with shortlisting and contingent
design fees can serve as a welfare enhancing mechanism to incentivize contractors. On
the other hand, if building costs are the private information of contractors, for suﬃciently
low design cost, the incentive of searching for a low building price can overcome the com-
mitment problem. There we ﬁnd a non-degenerate equilibrium under sequential search
where contractors choose high design eﬀort with probability 1. In that case, sequential
search may outperform competitive bidding.
Third, our paper is related to the articles on auction theory that consider the usage
of shortlisting to recruit ﬁrms as participants in an auction where shortlisted ﬁrms are
reimbursed for bid preparation costs. In this literature the auctioneer invites potential
suppliers to participate in competitive bidding over the design and subsequent supply of
custom-made equipment. In that case, the auctioneer is interested in obtaining a low price
but also wishes the experts to invest in design eﬀort (see, for example, Laﬀont and Tirole
(1993)). More recently, Kaplan and Sela (2006) study reimbursements in the framework
of a second-price auction. Similar to us, Gal, Landsberger, and Nemirovski (2007) and
Fan and Wolfstetter (2008) look at ﬁrst-price auction. In these contributions, the contract
to be auctioned does not have the feature of credence goods—the buyer knows perfectly
the type of the service she needs. There, shortlisting is for the purpose of screening the
contractors. Due to the credence goods feature, shortlisting has a very diﬀerent function
in our setup: it serves as a commitment device.
To our knowledge, our paper is the ﬁrst to account for the credence goods feature in in-
frastructure contracting, the ﬁrst paper studying competitive bidding in the procurement
of credence goods and the ﬁrst paper to examine the impact of asymmetric information
5under sequential search in the procurement of credence goods.
2 Description of the Model
The government wishes to develop an infrastructure project, but is uncertain about which
design of the project is appropriate. The range of possible design is [0,1]. The government




V if α = a;
0 if α ̸= a,
where V > 0. The government does not know her own type α and has a uniform prior on
[0,1]. Thus, an unguided guess will not yield the right choice with a positive probability.4
There is an inﬁnite population of identical contractors, indexed by k ∈ {1,2,··· ,+∞}.
Contractors serve a dual role: they recommend a design of the project to the government
and, if chosen by the government, build the project according to the recommended design.
The design of the project is costly to produce for the contractors. For simplicity, the
contractors must choose high or low design eﬀort. High design eﬀort leads to the correct
design α. Low design eﬀort leads to a random design drawn from a uniform distribution
on [0,1].5 The cost of high design eﬀort is c > 0 and the cost of low design eﬀort is zero.
For Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6, we assume that contractors are homogeneous in their cost
to implement a design, and that cost is public information and is normalized to zero.6
4The important assumption for the analysis is that V (a,α) is a common value, i.e. independent of the
contractor delivering the project. In a more elaborate model, the value of the implemented design would
depend monotonically on its distance from the best design. Furthermore diagnosis may be be imperfect.
But as long as there are common factors critical to the value of the service and their discovery depends
on the eﬀorts of the contractors in the same way, our analysis remains qualitatively the same.
5Note that the model does not leave the experts discretion over their recommendations: if the contrac-
tor invests high design eﬀort he learns the true α, and the design he delivers has to be correct, otherwise,
it has to be a random draw from a uniform distribution and the design will be wrong with certainty. This
is for the purpose of avoiding uninteresting multiplicities in the communication between contractors and
the government.
6The assumption made here is appropriate if building costs depend on the speciﬁcities of the project
and are the same for all contractors (common value assumption). Our results remain qualitatively the
same if contractors are heterogeneous in their building costs as long as they learn about their costs before
deciding about design eﬀorts—this may be an appropriate assumption for the case of building costs
being dependent on the speciﬁcities of the contractors, for example experience. The analysis changes if
contractors learn about their costs after deciding about design eﬀorts—we consider this case in section 7.
6The search cost of sampling each contractor is s. We assume V ≥ c+s, i.e. in a ﬁrst best
case it is always eﬃcient to build the project.
There are two sources of incentive problems: 1) the government can not not observe the
contractors’ design eﬀort and hence can not be certain whether the design recommended
by a particular contractor is the right one; and 2) the contractors have more information
about the government’s problem after the designing phase.
We refer to an equilibrium as non-degenerate if contractors choose high design eﬀort
with strictly positive probability, and an equilibrium as degenerate if all contractors choose
low design eﬀorts.7
We use the following deﬁnition of eﬃciency to evaluate the performance of a procure-
ment method.
Deﬁnition 1. Eﬃciency implies that only one contractor is sampled. That contractor
spends high design eﬀort and comes up with the right design. The right design is imple-
mented at its marginal cost 0.
3 Traditional Design-Build Approach
Design-Build is a widely used delivery system in public sector procurement projects. See,
for example, Ndekugri and Turner (1994) and Molenaar and Songer (1998). There, a
contractor is selected and the government procures design and building services from
this selected contractor. The advantage of this approach is the easiness of coordination
between design and implementation of design (building), since both jobs are carried out
by the same contractor. As we see in the following remark, independent of the selection
process of the contractor, Design-Build always leads to a serious moral hazard problem
and is extremely ineﬃcient in that the contractor’s design eﬀort is minimum.
Remark 1. Under the Design-Build contracting approach, there only exists degenerate
equilibrium where the selected contractor chooses low design eﬀort.
Suppose a contractor has been awarded a contract for design and building at price
p, where p could have been determined either through competitive bidding or bilateral
bargaining and the contractor has been determined through either random sampling,
competitive bidding, sequential search, or some other selection approach. Recall that the
design eﬀort is not observable to the government. Given the contract, working out the
right design leads to a ﬁnal payoﬀ p−c for the contractor, while choosing low design eﬀort
7The equilibrium concepts are borrowed from Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003).
7brings him a higher payoﬀ p. Hence there is no way that the procurer will ﬁnd out that
the contractor has shirked and provided a wrong design as the government does not have
this information. The only equilibrium of the game is a degenerate one.8
The remark above is in line with the prevalent concerns in the engineering literature
regarding the Design-Build contracting method - Design-Build sacriﬁces quality and de-
sign innovation (see, for example, Akintoye and Fitzgerald (1995).)9 The economic driving
force behind this is that, given a selected contractor, since design eﬀort is unobservable
and it is not veriﬁable by the government, and low design eﬀort leads to a higher payoﬀ
for the contractor, since the high eﬀort is more costly to the contractor while the price
remains the same. As an alternative to Design-Build approach, the procurer may en-
gage an architect to prepare the design before eliciting construction bids from contractors
(Design-Bid-Build approach). This approach involves competitive bidding among con-
tractors, but suﬀers from the same moral hazard problem if the government relies on one
selected architect for the design of the project and design eﬀort is non-veriﬁable.
4 Multi-stage Competitive Bidding
In this section, we consider a variation of the Design-Build approach, which we refer to
as “multi-stage competitive bidding”. The novel feature is that more than one contractor
is sampled to produce a design and design eﬀort costs are reimbursed contingently. The
game proceeds as follows.
1. Shortlisting Stage: The government randomly samples n contractors from the con-
tractor pool. The set of sampled contractors is denoted as K = {1,··· ,n}. The
government commits to use competitive bidding in awarding the building contract.
She also commits to a contingent design fee d.
2. Design Stage: Sampled contractors simultaneously choose design eﬀort ei ∈ {0,1}
and receive a signal αi.10
8In practice there are ways that the moral hazard problem may be mitigated, for example, through
reputation, certiﬁcation of the architects, repeated interaction. Despite that, too little design eﬀort is
still a concern when Design-Build approach is used. (See, for example, Akintoye and Fitzgerald (1995).)
Dulleck, Kerschbamer, and Sutter (2011) document experiments where experts’ reputation does not help
to increase market eﬃciency.
9In Wikipedia, it is reported that design and price selected through Design-Build approach arouses
public suspicion and can lead to loss of public conﬁdence. (See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Design-
build.)
10We do allow for mixed strategies in which case we denote by xi the probability that a contractor
83. Bidding Stage: Each contractor submits a plan (ai,pi), where ai is the design con-
tractor i recommends and pi is the price he charges for the implementation of that
design.
4. Building Stage: The government learns about the plans. If ai = aj for any i,j ∈ K,
the contractors’ designs match one another. The government chooses the contractor
with the lowest price to build the project, and pays him the price he has quoted
plus the design fee d. The losing contractors receive design fee d. Otherwise, the
government quits the market without carrying out the project and no design fee is
paid.11
The shortlisting stage is also referred to as the pre-qualiﬁcation stage in contracting
practice. As we have made the simplifying assumption that the contractors are homo-
geneous, any contractor is qualiﬁed for the project and random sampling satisﬁes the
need of pre-qualiﬁcation. The assumption that at the building stage the project is only
implemented if all the contractors’ designs coincide and that contractors are reimbursed
only if the project is implemented, though a bit extreme, captures the casual observation
that the government typically carries out a project only if advices on a project converge.
If experts opinions diverge too much, a project is usually dropped or postponed. In this
case, experts may not get reimbursed for their previous inputs. Reimbursing the design
eﬀort cost at the building stage corresponds to common practice of rebating bidding cost
when the bid preparation is costly.
Suppose that the government is of type α and chooses design fee d. Use pl to denote
the lowest price from the competitive bidding. The government’s payoﬀ is:

      
      
V − nd − pl − ns if ai = aj = a, ∀i,j ∈ K;
−nd − pl − ns if ai = aj ̸= a, ∀i,j ∈ K;
−ns otherwise.
A contractor i who has been sampled by the government receives the following payoﬀ
given his design eﬀort ei ∈ {0,1} and his strategy (ai,pi):

      
      
d + pi − eic if ai = aj and pi ≤ minpj, ∀j ∈ K, j ̸= i;
d − eic if ai = aj and pi > minpj, ∀j ∈ K, j ̸= i;
−eic otherwise.
chooses ei = 1.
11The equilibrium outcome remains the same if the project is implemented as long as two contractors’
designs match. But mathematical expressions become much more complex.
94.1 Equilibria and Eﬃciency
The strategy of the government is to choose the contingent design fee d and the number
of shortlisted contractors K. The strategy of a sampled contractor i is a triple, (xi,ai,pi),
where xi is the probability that contractor i chooses high design eﬀort, ai is the design he
recommends, and pi is the price he proposes for implementing the design ai.
Remark 2. There always exists a degenerate equilibrium where none of the shortlisted
contractors chooses high design eﬀort, that is xi = 0, i ∈ K. Each player gets 0 payoﬀ in
such an equilibrium.
At the design stage, the best response to other contractors’ choice of zero design eﬀort
is zero design eﬀort. Foreseeing that none of the contractors exerts high design eﬀort,
the government will not participate in the game. Hence everyone gets zero payoﬀ from a
degenerate equilibrium.
Nevertheless, it is more interesting to examine a non-degenerate equilibrium where
contractors spend positive design eﬀort and the right design is indeed produced and
implemented with positive probability. Ideally one wishes for an equilibrium, where only
one contractor spends high design eﬀort, the right design is produced and the project is
built at a low cost. However, as we show in the next remark, there exists no pure strategy
equilibrium that leads to high design eﬀort by one ﬁrm only.
Remark 3. There does not exist any pure strategy equilibrium where one of the contrac-
tors chooses high design eﬀort while the others choose low design eﬀort.
Given that the other sampled contractors choose low design eﬀort, it is a best response
for a contractor to choose low eﬀort as well on being sampled. This excludes the possi-
bility that full eﬃciency is achieved through the competitive bidding game stated above.
Nevertheless, as we show in the following, when the cost of design eﬀort and search is
suﬃciently low, full eﬃciency can be nearly implemented, but only at the expense of extra
design eﬀort and search cost. For this purpose we focus on the existence of an equilibrium
where all the sampled contractors choose high design eﬀort in the following analysis.
Lemma 1. Suppose all the K sampled contractors have chosen high design eﬀorts at
the design stage, the equilibrium at the bidding stage is given by (ai,pi) = (α,0) for any
i ∈ K.
Proof. Given that all the shortlisted contractors have chosen the high design eﬀort at
the design stage, suppose all the other contractors follow the recommended strategy of
10aj = α. Contractor i, by recommending ai = α, may become the winner in the bidding
game and receives some nonnegative price for building the project in addition to getting
reimbursed the design fee d. By recommending otherwise, the designs will not match and
contractor i gets 0 payoﬀ. Hence recommending ai = α is the best response for contractor
i. Given ai = α for all sampled contractors, it is a mutual best response to submit a
bid which is equal to the marginal cost of implementing the recommended design, as in a
standard Betrand competition.
The next lemma shows that at the design stage, there indeed exists an equilibrium
where all sampled contractors choose high design eﬀorts if the design fee set by the
government is suﬃciently high.
Lemma 2. It is a pure strategy equilibrium that all sampled contractors choose high design
eﬀort at the design stage where d ≥ c.
Proof. Given that the other contractors have chosen high design eﬀort, choosing high
design eﬀort as well leads to a net payoﬀ of d − c ≥ 0, while choosing a low design eﬀort
leads to a payoﬀ of 0. Therefore, choosing high design eﬀort is a best response to the high
design eﬀort of the other contractors.
Finally, one has to ﬁnd out the optimal design fee for the government and the optimal
number of shortlisting for the government. The purpose of the contingent design fee is to
ensure that all the sampled contractors will participate in the game.
Proposition 1. If c + s ≤ V
2 , there exists a non-degenerate equilibrium where the gov-
ernment shortlists two contractors and chooses the contingent design fee d = c. In this
equilibrium (i) both shortlisted contractors participate in the game and choose high design
eﬀort. (ii) Each contractor submits a design that truthfully reveals the need of the gov-
ernment and a price that equals marginal cost of zero. (iii) Each contractor is chosen to
implement the design with equal probability at the ﬁnal building stage.
Proof. Given the non-degenerate equilibrium of the game at the bidding stage, a con-
tractor’s proﬁt from building the project is 0. His entire proﬁt therefore comes from
the design fee. A contractor’s expected payoﬀ from participating in the game is −c + d,
expecting that he himself and his competitors will choose high design eﬀort and their
recommended designs will match. Hence, as long as d ≥ c, the contractors’ individual
rationality constraints are satisﬁed and each of them is happy to participate in the game.
Since the government’s payoﬀ is strictly decreasing in her payment to the contractors, the
optimal design fee she will choose is d = c. Finally, since two contractors are suﬃcient to
11ensure a correct design and fully competitive bidding, the government will only sample
two contractors if the total procurement cost does not exceed the value of the project, i.e.
V ≥ 2(d + s).
Proposition 1 shows that K = 2 is the optimal number for shortlisting under public
information. This is due to the simplifying assumption that a contractor produces the
right design if he invests in high design eﬀort. It may be optimal to shortlist more than
two contractors if, after investing, each contractor comes up with a design that is a noisy
estimate of the right one, or if contractors have private information about their building
costs, as we will discuss in Section 7. At the bidding stage, since the contractors are
homogeneous, two contractors are suﬃcient to drive the building price down to marginal
cost, as in Betrand competition.
To coordinate on the non-degenerate equilibrium, the government with c + s < V/2
only needs to set the design fee marginally above c so that both contractors get strictly
positive proﬁt from participating in the game.
When the sum of search cost and design cost is too high (c + s > V/2), only the
degenerate equilibrium exists. If this is the case, it is too costly to elicit the right design
and the project is abandoned.
Proposition 2. If c+s ≤ V/2, the social loss of the multi-stage competitive bidding game
is c + s.
Proof. From Proposition 1, in the non-degenerate equilibrium, two shortlisted contractors
spend high design eﬀort, and the right design is produced and implemented at zero charge.
Therefore, the only waste in comparison to the social welfare benchmark is the search cost
for sampling one extra contractor and the design eﬀort cost of one contractor.
When the design eﬀort cost and search cost are suﬃciently low in comparison to
the value of the right project to the government, the social loss from the multi-stage
competitive bidding game is negligible. Shortlisting two contractors and the contingent
design fee together are suﬃcient to ensure that both sampled contractors participate in the
game and both choose high design eﬀort to produce the right design for the government.
5 Sequential Search
An alternative way of awarding the contract, instead of multi-stage competitive bidding,
is sequential search. There, design and build are also awarded to the same contractor and
12multiple contractors may be requested to submit a design and a price for building. The
crucial diﬀerence from competitive bidding is that contractors are sampled sequentially
instead of simultaneously. As analyzed by Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003), the game
involves an inﬁnite number of discrete periods with each period unfolding as follows:
1. A contractor is chosen at random and oﬀers a contract (d,p) where d is the design
fee and p the price for implementing the design. If accepted, a contract requires
the government to pay d to the contractor. In return, the contractor recommends a
design and the government has the option to procure the project from the contractor
at price p at any future date.
2. The government decides on one of the following actions: (i) accept the contract; (ii)
sample a new contractor; (iii) procure the project from a contractor the government
previously sampled; (iv) quit the project.
3. If the government accepts the contract, she pays the fee d and incurs a cost s > 0.
4. Next, the contractor chooses the design eﬀort e ∈ {0,1}. The contractor is allowed
to randomize between the two eﬀort levels with x ∈ [0,1], the probability of high
design eﬀort.
5. Finally, the contractor learns the design.
If the government engages in sequential search in awarding the contract, contractors
never choose high design eﬀort with probability 1.
Remark 4. Under sequential search, there does not exist an equilibrium where a contrac-
tor chooses high design eﬀort with probability 1.
If the government only samples one contractor, the sampled contractor will choose
low design eﬀort, and the right design will not be produced. If the government instead
samples two contractors in sequence, each contractor knows that the other contractor
will or has been sampled, and will therefore choose high design eﬀort. However, for the
government, expecting that the ﬁrst sampled contractor chooses high design eﬀort, will
not sample a second contractor. As a result, there does not exist an equilibrium where
the government always samples more than one contractor and each sampled contractor
chooses high design eﬀort.
Under sequential search, as shown by Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003), when search
cost s is suﬃciently low and c+ s
m ≤ V
2 with m ∈ (0,1), there exists an equilibrium where
13the government samples a second contractor with positive probability strictly less than 1,
and each sampled contractor chooses high design eﬀort with positive probability strictly
less than 1. The outcome of the equilibrium is that the right design is delivered with
probability strictly less than 1.
6 Welfare Comparison
According to Deﬁnition 1, social eﬃciency requires that the right design be implemented
if and only if V ≥ c + s. As we see from previous analysis, for V ∈ [c + s,2(c + s)), none
of the three approaches is able to elicit high design eﬀort from the contractors. Hence,
none of the approaches achieves full eﬃciency.
For V ≥ 2(c + s), multi-stage competitive bidding has an equilibrium where sampled
contractors choose high design eﬀort for sure and the right design is produced and im-
plemented. In comparison, the Design-Build approach always elicits low design eﬀort,
while sequential search elicits high design eﬀort and the right design with positive prob-
ability less than 1 for a subset of V ≥ 2(c + s). Therefore, for V ≥ 2(c + s), multi-stage
competitive bidding is superior to both Design-Build approach and sequential search.
Remark 5. If V ∈ [c+s,2(c+s)), none of the three contracting approaches elicits positive
design eﬀort from the contractors. If V ≥ 2(c + s), multi-stage competitive bidding is
superior to Design-Build and sequential search.
Under Design-Build approach, the moral hazard problem leads to low design eﬀort.
Under competitive bidding and sequential search, since the government uses multiple
contractors to discipline the behavior of the contractors at the design stage, the moral
hazard problem is mitigated.
Though solving partly the moral hazard problem, sequential search suﬀers from the
critical drawback that the government can not commit to sample two contractors, which
leads to the social ineﬃciency that though high design eﬀort is chosen with positive proba-
bility, that probability is always less than 1. Under competitive bidding, this commitment
problem disappears because competitive bidding itself serves as a commitment tool to use
multiple contractors for design purpose. As a result, sequential search is inferior to com-
petitive bidding as too little design eﬀort is provided with the former.
From Proposition 2, the social cost of multi-stage competitive bidding is c + s, one
extra design eﬀort cost plus one extra search cost. When these costs are low and negligible,
the competitive bidding approach is nearly eﬃcient. Furthermore, the outcome from the
14competitive bidding is the second-best if the government’s objective is to maximize her
own net payoﬀs.
A side issue is whether competition improves welfare or not. Under sequential search,
competition may be in conﬂict with good incentives for the contractors to choose high
design eﬀort, and imposing a ﬂoor on the price of building the project may be welfare-
improving, as noted by Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003). Under competitive bidding,
price competition helps the government to achieve the minimum cost in building the
desired project. Therefore, whether competition improves social welfare or not depends
critically on the underlining contracting approach. This suggests that competition itself
may not be to blame for social ineﬃciency. Rather, how to harness competition and the
ability to commit to a mechanism are the key in improving welfare.
7 Asymmetric Information
In this section, we relax the assumption that contractors are homogeneous in their building
costs and examine the impact of asymmetric information. This is relevant if the projects
are speciﬁc and contractors learn about their building costs when producing the design.12
Suppose γi ∈ [0, ¯ γ], ﬁrm i’s building cost, is the private information of contractor i
and is revealed to i after the design eﬀort is sunk. Assume that observing own building
cost is independent of design eﬀort and is costless to a supplier. The underlying random
variable Γi is identically and independently distributed according to a continuous and
diﬀerentiable distribution function G(·), with density g(·). Suppose V is suﬃciently large
so that for every γ a non-degenerate equilibrium may exist under competitive bidding.
Besides the moral hazard problem, the Design-Build approach suﬀers from an extra
drawback: the price that is ﬁxed ex ante may not cover building cost. This will either
lead to renegotiation of the building price of the project or a project being dropped as
the contractor may suﬀer a loss and quit the project.
For multi-stage competitive bidding, suppose the procurer uses a second price auction
instead of a ﬁrst price auction so that truthful bidding is an equilibrium in (weakly) dom-
inant strategies.13 Diﬀerent from our results in Section 4, the government may shortlist
12Another relevant setting is that contractors have heterogeneous costs which are largely determined
by experience, i.e. known before the contractor’s decision about design eﬀort. This will not change the
analysis presented above. See our discussion in Footnote 6.
13This replacement is purely for the purpose of easy exposition. Revenue equivalence holds in this
setting. That is, given the same number of sampled contractors, the government’s expected payoﬀ from
a ﬁrst-price auction is identical to that of a second-price auction.
15more than two contractors in equilibrium. For the government, shortlisting more contrac-
tors leads to higher total design and search costs, while having more contractors at the
bidding stage leads to a lower expected building price. The trade-oﬀ between the costs
and beneﬁts for the government determines the optimal number of shortlisted contractors.
As long as the beneﬁt from sampling one extra contractor is larger than its cost c+s, the
government will increase the number of shortlisted contractors.
Denote by Γe
(i:K) as the the expected value of the ith lowest order statistic of K
random variables, each distributed independently and identically according to G(·). K is









(2:K+1) ≤ c + s (1)
are satisﬁed. In Condition (1), Γe
(2:K−1) − Γe
(2:K) captures the expected decrease of the
building price if K contractors instead of K − 1 contractors participate in the bidding
stage. We summarize the main ﬁndings in the following remark.
Remark 6. When building costs are private information of the contractors and are re-
vealed to them after design eﬀort is sunk, it may be optimal for the government to sample
more than two contractors.
With asymmetric information, whether the commitment problem occurs under sequen-
tial search depends on the design costs. Under sequential search, the procurer determines
an optimal stopping rule ¯ p for the building contract. If the building price quoted by a
sampled contractor exceeds ¯ p, the procurer samples the next contractor. If the quoted
price is below ¯ p, the procurer stops searching and procures the building of the project
from that contractor. Suppose that any sampled contractor chooses high design eﬀort
with probability 1. Given any stopping rule ¯ p of the procurer, a contractor on being
sampled infers that he is either the ﬁrst contractor the procurer has sampled or all the
previous sampled contractors have quoted a price above ¯ p. Thus, he quotes a price above
¯ p if his marginal cost is above ¯ p and quotes a price equal to ¯ p if his marginal cost is below
¯ p.
Consider an equilibrium where the equilibrium design fee is equal to its marginal cost
c. The procurer chooses the optimal stopping rule ¯ p to minimize her expected total cost
¯ p+ 1
G(¯ p)(c+s), where 1
G(¯ p) is the number of contractors the procurer expects to sample until
14Note that g(2:K)(x), the density of the second lowest order statistic, is equal to K(K−1)g(x)G(x)(1−
G(x))K−2. First part of Condition (1) becomes
∫ ¯ γ
0 t(K − 1)(K − 2)g(t)G(t)(1 − G(t))K−3dt −
∫ ¯ γ
0 t(K −
1)Kg(t)G(t)(1 − G(t))K−2dt ≥ c + s.
16she ﬁnds a contractor with a quote below ¯ p. For uniform distribution on [0,1], G(¯ p) = ¯ p
and the optimal stopping rule for the buyer is ¯ p =
√
c + s. For the contractors, choosing
high design eﬀort leads to a payoﬀ equal to
c − c + G(¯ p)E[¯ p − γ | γ < ¯ p] =
1
2
(c + s). (2)
The third term on the LHS of (2) is a contractor’s expected payoﬀ on being sampled when
he has a marginal building cost below ¯ p and expects to get the building contract at price
equal to ¯ p. Choosing low design eﬀort leads to a payoﬀ equal to
c + G(¯ p)





for the contractor. The second term on the LHS of (3) is a contractor’s expected payoﬀ on
being sampled when he is the ﬁrst sampled contractor—the only event that he provides
a wrong design and is not discovered and this occurs with probability G(¯ p)—and at the
same time has a marginal cost below ¯ p. Contractors choose high design eﬀort if and only
if (2) is larger than (3). In a competitive equilibrium where the design fee is driven down
to its marginal cost c, contractors will choose high design eﬀort if and only if
s ≥ c + (c + s)
3/2. (4)
Note that in (4), LHS is constant with respect to c while RHS is an increasing function
in c, and the inequality (4) holds when c is small and fails when c becomes suﬃciently
large. Therefore, there exists a ¯ c that satisﬁes
s = ¯ c + (¯ c + s)
3/2 (5)
such that (4) holds if c ≤ ¯ c and fails if c > ¯ c.
Remark 7. If building costs are the private information of the contractors and are revealed
to them only after design eﬀort is chosen, there exists non-degenerate equilibrium where
sampled contractors always choose high design eﬀort if the design cost is suﬃciently low
(c ≤ ¯ c). There the commitment issue in the case of complete information about building
costs may be overcome by the procurer’s incentive in search for low building costs. If the
design cost is high, the commitment problem remains and sampled contractors choose high
design eﬀort with probability strictly less than 1.
We conclude this section with a numerical example where under competitive bidding
it is optimal for the procurer to sample more than two contractors and sequential search
outperforms auctions for low design cost.
17Example 1. Suppose γ is uniformly distributed on [0,1], c = 0.0225 and s = 0.04.
Under competitive bidding, sampling ﬁve contractors is optimal for the procurer. The
total expected procurement cost for the procurer is 0.645 under competitive bidding. Under
sequential search, the procurer sets a reservation price (stopping rule) equal to 0.25 and
in expectation four contractors need to be sampled to get a quote below 0.25. The total
expected procurement cost for the procurer under sequential search is 0.5.
When the design cost is suﬃciently low and commitment is not an issue, the optimal
stopping rule under sequential search serves as a substitute for a reserve price under
competitive bidding,15 as the stopping rule optimally restricts the winning price below
the second lowest cost. As a result, sequential search ensures a lower building price.
Furthermore, in expectation, a smaller number of contractors is sampled to achieve a price
below the stopping price. Therefore, sequential search outperforms auctions in Example
1. Moreover, in comparison to competitive bidding with reserve where the contract may
not be awarded, sequential search with an optimal stopping rule “fails gracefully” — the
procurer continues to search as long as the building price is not suﬃciently low.
8 Conclusion
Contracting for large infrastructure projects is a major responsibility of government, who
usually lack the expertise to specify fully the demanded project. Whereas contractors,
typically experts on such projects, in their bids advise of the needed design of the project,
while producing the right design is usually costly. This is a typical credence goods prob-
lem.
We have modeled the contracting for infrastructure projects taking such credence
goods features into account and examined the performance of commonly used contract-
ing methods, including the Design-Build approach, multi-stage competitive bidding, and
sequential search. In our analysis the Design-Build approach always leads to low de-
sign eﬀort. If building costs are public information, the multi-stage competitive bidding
involving shortlisting of contractors, separation of design from bid and building of the
project, and contingent compensation of multiple bidders on design eﬀorts almost im-
plements social eﬃciency. Shortlisting multiple contractors serves as a commitment tool
for the government to use multiple contractors to elicit the right design, while rebating
the shortlisted contractors for designing eﬀort provides incentives for them to choose high
15For optimal auctions with reserve price, see for example Myerson (1981) and McAfee and McMillan
(1987).
18design eﬀort. Under sequential search, the right design is produced and implemented with
probability strictly less than one, because it suﬀers from a commitment problem of the
government. Thus, when building costs are public information, multi-stage competitive
bidding is superior to both sequential search and Design-Build.
If building costs are private information of the contractors and are revealed to them
after design cost is sunk, it may be optimal for the government to sample more than
two contractors under competitive bidding as the beneﬁt from sampling more than two
contractors for lower expected building price may dominate the extra search costs and
design eﬀort costs. Under sequential search, the incentive of the procurer to search for low
building price may overcome the commitment problem if design cost is suﬃciently low.
In that case we ﬁnd an equilibrium where contractors choose high design eﬀort for sure
and sequential search may outperform competitive bidding. This is because the procurer
chooses a stopping price lower than the expected equilibrium price under competitive
bidding and the expected number of contractors to be sampled is lower than the number
of shortlisted contractors under competitive bidding.
A relevant issue we have not analyzed in this paper is that contractors may be het-
erogeneous in their design costs (or alternatively the contractors diﬀer in their ability of
producing quality designs). This would complicate the analysis as the ﬁrms that are more
eﬃcient in designing may have higher building costs. Furthermore, if contractors have
both private information regarding design costs and building costs, screening arises both
at the design stage and the building stage. This remains an interesting agenda for future
research.
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